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JUDGING RULES, RULING JUDGES
STEPHEN C. YEAZELL*
I
INTRODUCTION
We conventionally and correctly observe that the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure are widely admired and imitated. This observation makes it tempting to conclude that the process producing those rules must be working reasonably well. Unfortunately, the second proposition does not follow from the
first. Substantial changes in the structure and personnel of rulemaking have
occurred in the sixty years since the Rules were first promulgated. The present-day Rules may be living off their intellectual capital rather than renewing
or increasing our store of procedural wisdom. To make matters worse, most
arguments about the rulemaking process in recent decades—arguments that are
taking an increasingly rancorous tone—have been about the relative roles of
the judiciary and the legislature. That frames the wrong debate. We should be
talking instead about why we have bureaucratized and complicated what began
as a nearly private and relatively simple enterprise. Bureaucracy and complexity are not pejorative terms, but they are limiting terms, and it makes sense to
examine the limitations that inhere in them.
We can rescue most of the threatened virtues of the federal rulemaking
process by taking two steps, one intuitive but politically difficult, the other
counterintuitive and also politically difficult. First, we should reduce the encrustation of steps in the process, returning it to essentially two steps before
presentation to Congress. Second, we need to change the role of judges in the
process. Over fifty years we have moved the judiciary from its original and appropriate role—arbiter of the ultimate fairness of proposed rules—to that of
initial drafters of the rules. All manner of ill consequences have flowed from
this shift, not the least of which has been an increase of clashes with Congress.
A short way of capturing this change is to say that we need to return from a system of judicially created rules back to a system of judicially scrutinized rules.
Making the case for this change is not difficult, however difficult its effectuation may prove.

Copyright © 1998 by Law and Contemporary Problems
This article is also available at http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/61LCPYeazell.
* Professor of Law, University of California at Los Angeles.
I am grateful to Paul Carrington, Judith Resnik, and David L. Shapiro for comments on an earlier
draft.

YEAZELL.FMT

230

04/01/99 4:59 PM

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 61: No. 3

II
AMBIVALENT BENTHAMITES
Almost two centuries ago Jeremy Bentham argued that almost everything
1
wrong with procedure could be attributed to “Judge and Company.” As Bentham saw it, judicially created procedure, endemic to the common law, was also
its bane. Never one to take a measured view of anything, Bentham attributed
all procedural evil to guild self-interest: Judges, former lawyers who consorted
with lawyers and who derived income from fees, had created a system benefiting only judges and lawyers. Bentham saw a vast, if unconscious, conspiracy to
create complexity from simplicity, and viewed procedural rules as professional
featherbedding. Yet, Bentham did not recommend legislation, his usual panacea, for procedural rules. Though Bentham hated judge-made rules, he recommended judge-made procedure. Proposing to abolish all standing rules and
forms, he wanted to substitute for them a judicially controlled, but ad hoc,
open-textured, untechnical procedure modeled on a wise parent presiding over
2
family disputes.
To judge by the current procedural system, we cannot decide whether to
heed or shun Bentham’s advice. On one hand, in the federal system judges do
make the procedural rules, and no one would describe the present system as
being without forms and rules. On the other hand, the flexibility of the Federal
Rules combines with the large power vested in the district court judge and creates broad discretionary procedural power that to some might seem analogous
to Bentham’s judicial parent. As with parents, in the hands of a master, such
discretion may create a procedural heaven; in the hands of the inept, inexperienced, or misguided judge, a procedural hell is more likely.
One can understand much contemporary procedural debate as an unconscious commentary on our approach to Bentham. For some, the transition
from eighteenth-century to Victorian parenting was itself a great mistake. For
them, Lord Chesterfield, with his stern but clear rules, was greatly preferable to
the formless sentimentality that makes the dysfunctional Mr. Dombey as likely
3
as the wise Betsy Trotwood. For others, the move from rules to discretion was
either laudable or inevitable, but the desirable style of parenting is very much
4
at issue.
1. C.J.W. ALLEN, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE IN VICTORIAN ENGLAND 54 (1997).
2. See id. at 9-10.
3. Stephen Subrin is perhaps the clearest in this respect. See generally Stephen Subrin, Fishing
Expedition: The Historical Background of the 1938 Federal Discovery Rules, 39 B.C. L. REV. 691
(1998); Stephen Subrin, How Equity Conquered the Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909 (1987). The parental models mentioned in the
text refer to PHILIP DORMER STANHOPE, FOURTH EARL OF CHESTERFIELD, 1694-1773, LETTERS TO
HIS SON AND OTHERS (E.P. Dutton 1929); CHARLES DICKENS, DOMBEY AND SON (1848); CHARLES
DICKENS, DAVID COPPERFIELD (1850).
4. Judith Resnik’s work contains a number of distinguished examples. See, e.g., Failing Faith:
Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 494 (1986); Changing Practices, Changing
Rules: Congressional Rulemaking on Civil Juries, Civil Justice, and Civil Judging, 49 ALA. L. REV. 133
(1997).
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As with many similarly inconclusive debates, it may be helpful to reflect on
the process by which we got to this point. Bentham attacked a process—
judicial framing of procedural rules—and espoused a substantive result—broad
judicial discretion. We have embraced both the process Bentham despised and
the result he advocated, adopting a system in which judges draft rules that bestow broad discretion on judges. Moreover, we have over the last fifty years
moved from a relatively flat process of proposal and promulgation to a multitiered system of consultation, review, and revision by multiple committees.
In this newer world, we should listen carefully to Bentham’s caution about
judicial domination of rulemaking, though for a reason nearly the opposite of
his. Bentham feared that judicial domination of procedure would serve mostly
5
to raise lawyers’ and judges’ fees. He feared that procedural designers and
procedural consumers were all too closely joined. I have the opposite concern—that contemporary judicial domination of rulemaking isolates procedural
designers, who today are mostly judges, from procedural consumers—lawyers
6
and litigants. If isolation from the bar is one feature of contemporary rulemaking, the other is an apparent opposite: diffusion of responsibility. Because
so many people and so many layers are involved in rulemaking, in a broader
7
sense, no one is in charge.
When combined, isolation of rulemakers and diffusion of rulemaking
authority threaten both judicial independence and judicial accountability. They
threaten independence because a judicially dominated rulemaking process is
more likely to produce faulty rules and, just as important, rules perceived to be
faulty. Faulty rules will inevitably produce either controversy or legislative action—both undermining judicial independence. Isolation and diffused authority also threaten accountability: Any quasi-legislative system in which no person or body has responsibility for a legislative agenda is likely to produce
paralysis rather than reform.
These features—isolation and diffusion—threaten especially bad results
under contemporary circumstances. In 1938, most procedure occurred in
5. In Bentham’s day, judges were still paid by fees collected on a per-motion basis, so any procedural ruling that generated the possibility of a motion or hearing carried with it the potential for increased judicial income.
6. There is some evidence to suggest that it is difficult for judges to keep litigation costs in mind
when designing procedures. A recent study of judicially designed case management processes suggests
that the result was increased cost to litigants. See James S. Kakalik et al., Just Speedy and Inexpensive?
An Evaluation of Judicial Case Management Under the Civil Justice Reform Act, 49 ALA. L. REV. 17,
18 (1997) (“Early judicial case management also is associated with significantly increased costs to litigants.”). The irony of this finding is that the Act in question was itself a congressional response to dissatisfaction with existing judge-made rules.
7. Some recent literature has recognized this diffusion and has recommended that rulemaking be
driven by a “chancellor,” who would assume central responsibility for the rulemaking process (as well
as other administrative tasks). See generally RUSSELL R. WHEELER & GORDON BERMANT, FEDERAL
COURT GOVERNANCE: WHY CONGRESS SHOULD—AND WHY CONGRESS SHOULD NOT—CREATE A
FULL-TIME EXECUTIVE JUDGE, ABOLISH THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, AND REMOVE CIRCUIT
JUDGES FROM DISTRICT COURT GOVERNANCE (1994). If added to the present system, this proposal
constitutes another undesirable complexity. If added in conjunction with the much simpler system
suggested below in the text, it seems likely to be unnecessary. See infra Part IV.
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courtrooms, visible to judges, as well as to lawyers. Every trial judge knew how
procedural rules worked in practice—he saw them on a daily basis. Today,
most procedural events happen outside the view of the Article III judges who
dominate rulemaking—in depositions, settlement negotiations, and in magis8
trate judges’ chambers. This invisibility renders judges blind to the workings
and possible consequences of some procedural rules. It may have the further
effect of inducing more confidence than is justified about those practices that
occur within the judicial range of vision. Over the past fifty years, we have
moved the location of rulemaking authority deeper into the judiciary even as
we moved the focus of procedure farther from the courtroom. The next section
chronicles the changes.
III
THE CHANGING STRUCTURE AND PERSONNEL OF RULEMAKING
9

Judicial rulemaking is broader than the Federal Rules, but the most visible
10
and influential judicial rulemaking has been federal. Since 1934, the Supreme
11
Court has had the power to make “general rules of practice and procedure.”
But, since 1934, nearly every important characteristic of the rulemaking process
has changed. Each change has been small. Each change has been understandable. But many changes have been regrettable.
In 1938, the original Advisory Committee, appointed by Chief Justice
Hughes, presented the Rules of Civil Procedure to the Court, which promulgated that draft. No judges sat as members of that original advisory committee.
12
Since that time, we have added between two and nine layers of rulemaking
and have increased judicial participation in the drafting process to the point of
domination. Whether these changes have produced a more thoughtful or a
more responsible process is doubtful. A brief sketch may make the point.
A. Process
In a short paragraph, the original Rules Enabling Act gave the rulemaking
13
power to the Supreme Court. The minutes of the next meeting of the Judicial
8. I am here loosely defining a procedural event as an activity undertaken by a lawyer in connection with a lawsuit. It could be a court appearance, a conversation with the opposing side, or a settlement conference with a judge.
9. Somewhat heroically, the Supreme Courts of New Jersey and Wyoming have discovered that
their respective constitutions give those tribunals exclusive power to make rules of practice and procedure and thus negate legislative acts that conflict with court-made rules. See Winberry v. Salisbury, 74
A.2d 406, 414 (N.J. 1950) (invalidating legislation that extended the time for appeal beyond that permitted by court-made rules); White v. Fisher, 689 P.2d 102, 103 (Wyo. 1984) (invalidating statute prohibiting statement of dollar figure in ad damnum clause of medical malpractice complaint).
10. See Act of June 19, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§§ 2071-2077 (1994)). The original Federal Rules of Civil Procedure did not take effect until 1938.
11. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1994).
12. The range depends on one’s criteria for a layer of rulemaking.
13. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1994). The second, and only other, paragraph of the Act authorized the
judicially promulgated rules to merge law and equity, a power of which the new Rules of Civil Proce-
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Conference, convened in September of 1934, contained an earnest solicitation
for the “cooperation of the members of the Bench and Bar throughout the
14
country” in the “discharge of this highly important and difficult task.” The
Supreme Court appointed an Advisory Committee, which four years later presented a draft to the Court.
The resulting Rules are history. In the short run, they merged law and equity and abolished technical pleading. In the long run, they have transformed
15
civil litigation. The Rules and their state analogues —by creating deep and
broad discovery, by expanding joinder, by extending the pretrial phase of litigation, and by taking that phase largely out of the courtroom and into lawyers’ offices—have reshaped civil procedure.
Though it is always dangerous to capture subtle changes in catch phrases,
one can summarize many of the changes by noting that in recent decades we
have seen the emergence of a distinction between “trial lawyers” and
16
“litigators” and between “trying” and “managing” cases. These distinctions
would have made no sense to the lawyers who drafted the original Federal
Rules. Then, as now, most cases ended before trial, but for the one case in
17
three that did not settle, trial was the likely destination. As a result, most
“procedural events” occurred before judicial eyes.
For several decades after the Rules’ adoption, one might have thought that
they had inaugurated procedural perfection, for few amendments were proposed or accepted. Then came three major waves of change, in 1966 (affecting
parties’ practice), 1970 (discovery), and 1983 (the etiquette and ritual of pretrial practice). Some of these changes proved controversial, either in anticipation or practice. Ordinarily mild-mannered lawyers can become wildly enthusiastic or deeply unhappy at the mention of the modern class action, introduced
by the 1966 amendments. We are continuing to debate whether expanded discovery, a product of the 1970 changes, has proved a boon or bane. The 1983
version of Rule 11, after inspiring enough writing to launch several academic
18
careers, was defanged a decade later, providing—depending on one’s point of
dure took notorious advantage. See Subrin, How Equity Conquered the Common Law, supra note 3, at
922.
14. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE 8 (Sept. 1934).
15. The Rules have deeply influenced U.S. procedure, both in the thirty-five states that have formally adopted some version of the Rules as their procedural regime, see generally John B. Oakley &
Arthur F. Coon, The Federal Rules in State Courts: A Survey of State Court Systems of Procedure, 61
WASH. L. REV. 1367 (1986), and also in those, like California and New York, that have remained Code
states while adopting the essential characteristics of the federal model. See id. at 1383, 1411.
16. See generally Samuel Gross & Kent Syverud, Don’t Try: Civil Jury Verdicts in a System Geared
to Settlement, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1996); Judith Resnik, From “Cases” to “Litigation”, 54 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 5 (Summer 1991).
17. Stephen C. Yeazell, The Misunderstood Consequences of Modern Civil Process, 1994 WIS. L.
REV. 631, 633 (reporting a drop in civil cases resolved by trial from about 20% in 1938 to about 4% in
1990).
18. The 1993 amendments substantially decreased the risk of violating Rule 11. First, they provided for a “safe harbor,” requiring notice by the opponent and a 21-day period in which to retract or
amend the offending document without penalty. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(1)(A). It is hard to imagine
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view—either an example of too-long-delayed justice or of judicial pusillanimity
in the face of an obstreperous bar.
A final example of a nonchange is the more recent experience involving
19
Rule 48. In 1973, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Colgrove v. Battin, which
validated the use of six-person juries in civil cases. It did so at a catastrophically bad time, as legislation and other developments were changing the demographic characteristics of the jury by insisting on cross-sectionality. Since Colgrove, a considerable body of respectable writing has demonstrated that the
smaller jury makes broad demographic representation harder to achieve and
20
erratic variations in verdicts more likely. Accordingly, in 1996, the Civil Rules
committee proposed an amendment to Rule 48, making clear that twelve ought
21
to be the normative size of the jury. The amendment was approved both by
the Rules Committee and the Standing Committee, but was rejected by the Judicial Conference in an almost hasty way, in part because of objections that in
the time since Colgrove many federal courtrooms with too-small jury boxes had
22
been built. This is not the way to make procedural rules.
Accompanying these substantive changes (if one can so describe alterations
in rules of procedure) were two parallel developments—in the complexity and
in what one might call the legitimacy of the rulemaking process. The original
Rules Enabling Act spoke of only two layers of rulemaking: the Supreme
Court, which promulgated the Rules, and Congress, which could override a
23
Rule. In practice, the process had only one significant step: The Advisory
Committee played the major role, with the Court and Congress presiding but
not interfering. Nor did the present-day Standing Committee on Rules and
Practice exist.

that this change will not result in some litigative games of “chicken,” with lawyers making dicey statements with the knowledge that they will have a second chance. Second, the amended rule contains a
mysterious provision allowing allegations for which there is no present factual basis if the party is
“likely” to find such support in discovery. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(3). Finally, the amended Rule
removes attorneys’ fees as the presumptive sanction for a violation, thus substantially decreasing the
opposing party’s incentive to bring a suspected violation to the court’s attention. See FED. R. CIV. P.
11(c)(2).
I take no position here about the desirability of these changes. Many voices have argued that the
1983 version of the Rule, at least in practice and perhaps in conception, operated unevenly, penalizing
civil rights plaintiffs much more harshly than others. See Stephen Burbank, The Transformation of
American Civil Procedure: The Example of Rule 11, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1925, 1938 (1989). My point
about the 1993 amendments is that they suggested that the Advisory Committee thought a Rule less
than a decade old had serious defects.
19. 413 U.S. 149 (1973).
20. The evidence is devastatingly summarized in Richard S. Arnold, Trial By Jury: The Constitutional Right to a Jury of Twelve in Civil Trials, 22 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 30 (1993).
21. Judith Resnik’s account in Changing Practices, Changing Rules, supra note 4, at 136-46, is both
concise and telling.
22. Interview with Paul Carrington, Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law (Apr. 13,
1998); Telephone Interview with the Honorable Patrick Higginbotham, Circuit Judge, Fifth Circuit
(Oct. 8, 1998); see also Stephen B. Burbank, Implementing Procedural Change: Who, How, Why, and
When?, 49 ALA L. REV. 221, 244 (1997).
23. Act of June 19, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§
2071-2077 (1994)).

YEAZELL.FMT

Page 229: Summer 1998] J UDGING RULES, RULING JUDGES

04/01/99 4:59 PM

235

Today’s process is, of course, quite different. It requires more steps to
24
amend a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure than it does to amend the U.S. Constitution. As described by a former Reporter to one of the Advisory Committees, amending a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure requires a dozen consultations, proceeding from public and bar suggestions to the Advisory Committee,
to the Reporter, to various academic and bar organizations, back to the Advisory Committee, to the Standing Committee, back to the Advisory Committee,
to public hearings, back to the Advisory Committee, again to the Standing
Committee, to the Judicial Conference, to the Supreme Court, and thence to
25
26
Congress. “Cumbersome,” the adjective used by one close observer, seems a
quite measured comment.
Slowness need not be a vice, if the resulting product is satisfactory. This essay is not the place for an assessment of the success of recent Federal Rules.
One can say that in the last three decades, new rules have engendered substantial controversy. It has been controversy that has reached beyond the profession’s usual resistance to change. The “retraction” of Rule 11 after a decade’s
experience provides one illustration, the scuttling of Rule 48 another. Continuing concern with the class action suit and with discovery provide further examples. Several have posited that “trans-substantivity”—neutral application
across fields of substantive law—is a desirable characteristic of procedural
27
rules. Invisibility is another: To the extent that debates about process displace debates about substantive law, the procedural system is not working optimally. The civil Rules have become more controversial over the last few decades, and that ought to alert us to look carefully at the system that has
28
produced this visibility.
This era of controversy began in 1973, when Congress rejected in their en29
tirety the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence. Privileges lay on the surface
of the dispute, but underneath the specific issues lay some congressional unrest

24. In this essay, I shall focus on the Rules of Civil Procedure, in part because I know them best,
and in part because in recent years their amendment has aroused the greatest controversy. The two
most notable exceptions to this proposition are the Federal Rules of Evidence, whose first incarnation
Congress rejected in its entirety because of disagreements with their treatment of privileges, and the
Bankruptcy Rules, controversy over which mostly flowed from the contested constitutional position of
the Bankruptcy Judges. Judging by congressional interest, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
have not aroused the same level of controversy.
25. See Paul Carrington, Making Federal Rules to Dispose of Manifestly Unfounded Assertions: An
Exorcism of the Bogy of Non-Trans-Substantive Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2067,
2120-23 (1989).
26. Telephone Interview with the Honorable Richard S. Arnold, Circuit Judge, Eighth Circuit
(Oct. 6, 1998).
27. Compare Robert Cover, For James Wm. Moore: Some Reflections on Reading the Rules, 84
YALE L.J. 718, 718 (1975) (arguing for differential application of rules to differing kinds of cases),
with Carrington, supra note 25, at 2068 (arguing against such a course).
28. To forestall misunderstanding, readers should understand that the process used to produce
rules should be visible, open, and transparent. See infra Part V.A.2. The resulting rules themselves,
however, should optimally be invisible because they are uncontroversial. This form of procedural invisibility may be impossible to reach, but it is a noble aspiration.
29. See Act of March 30, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-12, 87 Stat. 9.
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at what was perceived to be high-handedness in proposing and promulgating
Rules. That unrest had two components. First, any legislature will occasionally
be uneasy about a delegation of power. That unease will be at its height when
the delegated authority seems to be exercised in inappropriate ways, as with the
30
proposed evidentiary rules. Second, Congress had been hearing from some
lawyer-constituents that the rulemaking process was insufficiently open to
commentary, particularly critical commentary, from affected persons. Stephen
Burbank’s account of the decades-long development perceptively notes that the
judiciary’s greatest loss may have come in a battle that it nominally won. In
1983, the House of Representatives voted to block implementation of Rule 11.
Only the adjournment of the Senate prevented what would likely have been the
defeat of the Rule. Burbank argues that the promulgation of a Rule in the face
of so much political opposition did the judiciary great harm in its relations with
31
Congress, creating a “poisonous environment.”
Congress responded in two ways, with criticism and with statutory change.
The statutory change added time, open deliberation, and more layers to the
rulemaking process. Specifically, the 1988 Judicial Improvements and Access
32
to Justice Act formally required the system of advisory committees reporting
to a standing committee on rules of practice and procedure, and likewise for33
mally inserted the Judicial Conference itself into the process of rulemaking.
The result is procedure’s very own twelve-step program.
Congress reflected its continuing dissatisfaction two years later, with the
34
Civil Justice Expense and Delay Reduction Plan of 1990. That Act encouraged and required procedural experimentation at the district court level, permitting individual districts to adopt procedural rules departing from the Federal Rules in various respects, including a “tracking” system that would subject
cases to differing procedural rules depending on their characteristics. In the
same year Congress took the unusual step of debating a set of proposed
35
changes in discovery rules, suggesting continuing restiveness. Stephen Bur30. The original draft of the Federal Rules of Evidence proposed federalization of privileges and
the consequent abrogation and supplementation of state evidentiary privileges in federal court litigation. Whatever might be said on the merits about such a course of action, to propose it without hearing, notice, and preparation was at least ill-advised and arguably in violation of the Rules Enabling
Act.
31. See Burbank, supra note 22, at 228.
32. Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat. 4643 (1988) (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
33. 28 U.S.C. § 2073(b) (1994). The statute requires that the Judicial Conference appoint standing
and advisory committees and that the standing committee “recommend to the Judicial Conference . . .
such changes in rules proposed by a committee appointed [by the Conference].” Id. The statute does
not explicitly say that the Conference’s approval is necessary for a prospective rule to be forwarded to
the Supreme Court for promulgation. But the preexisting practice, reinforced by the statutory language, has continued, thus de facto making the Conference’s approval necessary for a rule to be sent to
the Supreme Court.
34. See Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§§ 471-482 (1994)).
35. The proposed amendments passed by overwhelming margins (99-1 in the Senate and unanimously in the House). The noteworthy event is not that the proposed amendments passed, but that
they were debated in Congress. See id.
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bank’s judgment that “[i]t is difficult . . . not to sense a crisis in federal proce36
dural reform” seems close to the mark.
B. Personnel
As the procedure has become more cumbersome, the personnel have
changed. Where lawyers once wrote the Rules and presented them to the
bench for a blessing, judges now dominate the process. As already noted, the
advisory committee that drafted the 1938 Rules had no judicial members; it
37
consisted entirely of lawyers and legal academics. Today judges comprise a
bit more than half of the Advisory Committee and Standing Committee, and all
of the Judicial Conference. Lawyer participation has declined as that of judges
increased. Today, lawyers comprise just a bit more than a third of the members
of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules. The tide had begun to shift in this
direction within two decades after the original Rules were enacted. In 1961,
just over half of the Advisory Committee’s members were practicing lawyers;
that proportion held through the early 1980s. By 1985, the proportion had
dropped to about twenty-five percent; over the last few years it has hovered between thirty-three and forty percent. The Committee that submitted the most
recent proposed changes in the Rules of Civil Procedure consisted of fourteen
members, five of whom were practicing lawyers—if one includes the Assistant
Attorney General of the Civil Division in this category. Seven are judges—six
of these from the federal courts and one from a state court. The remaining two
38
members are legal academics. The proportion of lawyers on the Standing
39
Committee, a body that had no analogue in 1938, is similar. And of course the
Judicial Conference, which now passes on the proposed rules before their submission to the Court, consists entirely of judges. So, during the same time in
which we have increased the layers of bureaucratic apparatus from two to
twelve, we have moved from a system dominated by lawyers to one dominated
by judges.

36. Stephen B. Burbank, Ignorance and Procedural Law Reform: A Call for a Moratorium, 59
BROOK. L. REV. 841, 842 (1993).
37. See Carrington, supra note 25, at 2119.
38. See COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE
OF THE UNITED STATES, PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE 150 (1998).
39. Five of the 16 members, or 31%, of the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure are practicing lawyers, again including the Department of Justice member in that category. See
id. at 149.
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During this time, the proportion of legal academics on the Advisory Com40
mittee has fallen in periodic spasms, from a high of almost forty percent in the
early years to a current level ranging between fifteen and twenty percent. One
could argue that the starting point was too high or that the low point is too low,
but some academic representation is probably a good idea. Academics provide
both valuable scrivening services—the Reporter has always been an academic—and perhaps some degree of disengagement from the litigation wars.
Academics may also play a more disguised role. Though drawn exclusively
from law schools and thus easily identified with the bar, in another sense these
persons represent the public. Not directly engaged in litigation, they have some
sense of how procedures will look to lay constituencies—parties, jurors, and the
more general public. Though I lack either the objectivity or the data to support
my conclusion, my sense is that these persons have played a generally constructive role, one that probably does not need fundamental rethinking.
IV
A PROPOSAL
The changes in structure and in personnel since 1938 might be desirable; indeed, at least one feature of the present process—increased transparency—is
probably superior. But, with the best of intentions, we have also created for the
judiciary and for the legal system some major problems. These are problems
that lie in three rough categories—political, practical, and substantive. Both as
a thought experiment and as a proposal for discussion, I should like to examine
the virtues of the Original Position: a two-step rulemaking process in which the
40. The Standing Committee came into being relatively recently, in 1958, so it does not provide a
useful comparison, and the Judicial Conference has always consisted entirely of judges.
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earlier stages are dominated by lawyers, with judges asked only to approve the
final result. The only change in the original position I recommend is the relocation of the final approving authority—from the Supreme Court, where it now
resides, to the Standing Committee on Practice and Procedure. This proposal
has several virtues to recommend it, as well as some objections that deserve
discussion if anyone is persuaded by the virtues of the proposal.
A. Neutrality as Justice, Neutrality and Politics
Politically, judges have two constituencies. Broadly seen, they serve the
public. Narrowly seen, they must relate to the other two branches of government. Judicial domination of rulemaking runs risks with both groups.
At a fundamental level, much of civil justice—particularly in the common
law environment—depends on the parties’ perception of the judge as neutral—
an arbiter of claims brought by the parties. In contemporary practice, we have
41
enshrined that proposition by enforcing parties’ agreements to arbitrate and
allowing them to stipulate to facts known to be false, submit to unconstitutional
42
43
assertions of territorial jurisdiction, and craft their own procedural rules. Although each of these practices is subject to limits, each reflects a notion of consensual procedure not only as expedient but also as just. As Mirjan Damaska,
writing in another context, put it: “From the Continental perspective, . . . [the
American] judge would appear to be more like the moderator of a judicial conference, or perhaps a supervisor of fair proceedings, . . . rather than the quintes44
sential decision maker.”
To be sure, judges taking such a stance might nevertheless write the procedural rules. But to have the rules themselves emerge from a group of once and
future contestants—lawyers populating the advisory committee—provides a
45
splendidly Rawlsian icing on the cake: Lawyers debating those rules have a
deep knowledge of implications, but no precise knowledge of how those rules
will affect them or their clients in any particular situation. To the extent that
lawyers characteristically work for an identifiable kind of client (for example,
injured individuals, insurance companies, real estate developers), the lawyers
on the committee may have some guesses regarding the effects of particular
rules. As a group, defendants, for example, will likely favor more specific
pleading standards, and plaintiffs the converse. But this prescience has limits:
41. See, e.g., Paul Carrington, ADR and Future Adjudication: A Primer on Dispute Resolution, 15
REV. LITIG. 485, 493 (1996).
42. See, e.g., National Equip. Rental v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311 (1964); FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(1).
From one standpoint, a defendant who has intelligently waived a jurisdictional objection has obviated
any constitutional objection. However, in circumstances where an intelligent choice is virtually negated, the provisions of Rule 12(h) make it possible to “waive” the objection.
43. FED. R. CIV. P. 29.
44. MIRJAN R. DAMASKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY: A COMPARATIVE
APPROACH TO THE LEGAL PROCESS 39 (1986).
45. Rawls describes his “veil of ignorance” as an effort “to use the notion of pure procedural justice as a basis of theory.” JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 136 (1971). Applying such a procedural theory to rules of procedure has a special justness about it.
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It is hard to say in advance whether expansive judicial powers over the pretrial
conference, or expanded powers to reopen judgments, or more flexible deployment of cross-claims, or a requirement that judges write their own findings
in bench trials will favor plaintiffs or defendants. To the extent that the ingrained bias persists, it can be addressed with careful composition of the com46
mittee itself.
When judges rather than lawyers frame rules by which they will decide between litigants, judges open themselves to criticism and the perception of partiality. That perception becomes acute when the judge decides an issue under a
47
rule that grants the court broad powers of discretion. When the judges have
played a major role in writing such a self-empowering rule, the distress can become overwhelming. Many have noted that a keynote of the current Rules is
that they grant judges a very large degree of discretion. At virtually every stage
of the process—amendment of pleading, the “good faith” of a factual or legal
investigation, advisability of reference to alternative dispute mechanisms, superiority of a class action, scope of discovery, severance and consolidation of trials—the Rules grant judges enormous discretion in the conduct and resolution
of disputes. Consider, for example, recent rounds of amendments to Rule 16,
dealing with pretrial conferences and settlement efforts. Both the 1983 and the
1993 amendments expanded the range of judicial discretion to shape the case,
urge settlement, employ “special procedures” instead of trial, and otherwise affect the outcome of a case, regardless of the wishes of the parties and their
48
49
counsel. The wisdom of this practice is debatable. The point is rather that a
rule expanding the discretion of judges would have much more force and legitimacy (if I may use that over-used term), if it had been drafted by a committee consisting entirely of lawyers, with a judicial body simply supplying an after-the-fact blessing. As Lon Fuller has noted, to have the contestants bestow
50
discretionary power on an arbiter signals a high degree of trust. That trust is
correspondingly lacking when the arbiters bestow such power on themselves.
When the committees producing such rules consist largely of judges, it gives
additional ammunition to those who doubt the wisdom of enlarging judicial discretion in this sensitive area. If we hold the judiciary accountable—but not directly responsible—for procedural rules, judges will act more independently.

46. See infra Part V.A.
47. Compare Jonathan R. Macey, Judicial Preferences, Public Choice, and the Rules of Procedure,
23 J. LEGAL STUD. 627 (1994) (arguing that judges will have an inherent preference for discretionmaximizing rules), with Janet Cooper Alexander, Judges’ Self-Interest and Procedural Rules, 23 J.
LEGAL STUD. 647 (1994) (arguing that such an argument is overstated). Nevertheless, a noteworthy
characteristic of modern procedural rules is the broad discretion that it accords to trial judges.
48. See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 16(c) advisory committee notes.
49. Compare Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982) (condemning judicial efforts to “manage” rather than to try cases), with David Shapiro, Federal Rule 16: A Look at the
Theory and Practice of Rulemaking, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1969 (1989) (approving broad discretion in
pretrial phase).
50. See Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353 (1978).
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The broad public and the subset of litigants and lawyers comprise one political constituency of judges. Judges also face a narrower yet more immediately powerful group: Congress. Practically speaking, Congress is the group
with the power to call judges to account for their actions, including those pertaining to rulemaking. As already noted, Congress has in recent decades been
51
restive about both the process and the substance of various federal rules.
From a structural perspective, such congressional restiveness is almost inevitable: Any body or group exercising delegated congressional power will draw
scrutiny and occasional critique from the delegator. Were the judiciary to remove itself from the actual drafting of the rules, some—though surely not all—
criticism might diminish. As things now stand, however, a proposed Rule starts
out in an advisory committee on which typically half the members are judges,
then proceeds through three additional bodies on which judges increasingly
dominate, and culminates in the Judicial Conference and the Supreme Court,
which, by definition, consist entirely of judges. Under such circumstances, if
Congress does not like something, the judiciary is the obvious group to blame,
and the ensuing accusations harm judicial independence.
B. Procedural Change and Judicial Vision
Practicality as well as politics warrants the reexamination of the present judicial role in procedural rulemaking. Over the last fifty years, the Rules have
removed more and more of day-to-day procedure from judicial sight. Judges
accordingly have less ability to assess the operation of rules of civil procedure
than they did sixty years ago. Discovery and settlement dominate contempo52
rary American civil practice. Over these last sixty years, we have moved from
a world of trials to a world of litigation, in which trials are a vanishing, some
53
would say a pathological, event. More important than the disappearance of
the trial is its cause. Kent Syverud, writing about the jury, recently captured
the essence of American civil process, arguing that there is a trade-off between
trial and pretrial process, and if we want more trials, we must be prepared to
54
curtail the pretrial process. Dean Syverud’s equation captures the essential
fact that U.S. civil litigation at the end of this century is dominated by its pre55
trial stage.
Others have, will, and should debate the desirability of this situation. For
our purposes, the important point is that the vanishing of the trial has also removed the center of procedural activity from judicial eyes. As that activity has

51. See supra text accompanying notes 28-33.
52. See, e.g., Kent D. Syverud, The Duty to Settle, 76 VA. L. REV. 1112 (1990).
53. See, e.g., Kent D. Syverud, ADR and the Decline of the American Civil Jury, 44 UCLA L. REV.
1935, 1944 (1997) (noting that “the civil jury trial appears to be an alternative for the freaks—an alternative to be avoided”).
54. See id. (arguing that the “[c]ivil process must be streamlined, particularly in the expensive discovery stage, before the option of fact finding by a civil jury will appear viable—or preferable—to a
significant fraction of civil litigants”).
55. See Yeazell, supra note 17, at 632-39.
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moved from judicial vision, it has become harder for judges to form accurate
56
views about the practical operation of procedural rules. In typical litigation, a
federal judge may rule on a preliminary motion on the pleadings, such as a jurisdictional challenge, will enter a scheduling order, and then hope that the parties do not misbehave too badly in discovery. If they do, and if the case finds
itself on the motion calendar, perhaps after a preliminary tussle before a magis57
trate judge, the judge will have very little sense of the case’s context. As a result, the judge will be unable to determine whether this is an isolated episode of
misbehavior by an otherwise cooperative party, or this is merely the visible tip
of an iceberg, in which one party—or both—are pursuing a take-no-captives
style of litigation.
Beyond this issue—of intense interest to the parties but not to rulemakers—
lies a more fundamental question: At a general level, are the procedural rules
working well? Answering that question in 1938 might not have been easy, but
because most procedure occurred in the courtroom, a district judge approaching it would at least have been able to draw on first-hand experience. Both motions and trial practice did so by definition. And, until 1938, the little that occurred between those two points was not governed by rules of procedure.
Today, most litigation activity occurs between those two points. Almost perversely, we ask judges today to take an increasing role in shaping procedural
rules, just as we have removed the bulk of procedure from the range of judicial
vision. While that may not be madness, it is at least not an intuitive move. It
would make sense if judges had comprised half of the 1938 Advisory Committee but now assumed only a background role. It might make sense if the roles
of judges and others had remained unchanged. It makes very little sense for
judges to have assumed an increasingly dominant role in rulemaking even as
the nature of civil process has moved out of the courtroom and into lawyers’ offices.
V
OBJECTIONS AND ADVANTAGES
Congress and the Supreme Court would each have to act to carry into effect
58
the change—or reversion to the original model—proposed above. To effect
the changes suggested here would require, at a minimum, amendment of 28
U.S.C. § 2072(a), which vests promulgating power in the Supreme Court, and §
2073(b), which requires the Judicial Conference to supervise and approve the
rulemaking procedure. More ambitiously, such a reform would also require re-

56. I exclude here the mega-case, in which the judge knows from early on that close supervision
will be required.
57. Magistrate judges hear some 129,000 civil non-trial matters per year. See ADMINISTRATIVE
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES tbl. 16 (1992). In particular, discovery and other pretrial matters dominate this docket.
58. See supra Part IV.A.-B.
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casting of the transparency requirements now contained in § 2073(c) to provide
59
appropriate substitutes for the current process.
The Court’s role would be simple to effect: It would have to change its recent practices. No statute specifies the composition of the Rules Advisory
Committee, but, as noted, recent practice has seen a majority or near-majority
60
of judges and a judge as chair. The Court could achieve part of this change
simply by replacing judges with lawyers as Advisory Committee vacancies occurred.
Each of these changes would require some rethinking, taking of deep
breaths, and self-abnegation by bodies that may not be most remarkable for
these characteristics. I ask the reader—particularly the judicial reader—to
postpone deciding whether such reconsideration is worth the effort until after
considering first a pair of objections to such a change and then a pair of advantages. Suppose for a moment that Congress and the Court were prepared to
consider these changes. Their merit would of course be the central topic of debate, but one can imagine subsidiary problems that might give pause to persons
otherwise attracted to the idea. In order for a discussion to focus on the merits,
I want to address those objections to reform, objections not trivial but also not
fatal.
A. Some Objections
1. The Constitution and the Rules: Delegation. The Rules Enabling Act
delegates to the Supreme Court the power to make rules of practice and
61
procedure. Although the wisdom of the delegation was vigorously debated,
its legality was not. Perhaps because judges had immemorially made
62
procedural rules, no one thought the issue doubtful. Another reason for the
absence of serious debate about the constitutionality of delegation may lie in
timing. The Rules Enabling Act was roughly contemporaneous with other New
Deal legislation, some of which raised even more serious delegation problems.
63
The most telling comparison is with the National Industrial Recovery Act,
portions of which were held unconstitutional in Schechter Poultry Corporation
64
v. United States. These provisions in Schechter remitted to “trade or industrial
59. For a more extended consideration of the transparency issues posed by this proposal, see infra
Part V.A.2.
60. See supra Part III.B.
61. Stephen Burbank’s article is the classic account. See Stephen Burbank, The Rules Enabling
Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015 (1982).
62. Indeed, some have taken the more extreme position that only judges can make procedural
rules. See, e.g., Linda S. Mullenix, Unconstitutional Rulemaking: The Civil Justice Reform Act and
Separation of Powers, 77 MINN. L. REV. 1283 (1993); see also supra note 9 (reporting a similar position
taken by two state supreme courts).
63. Pub. L. No. 73-67, ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195 (1933).
64. 295 U.S. 495 (1935). The other classical non-delegation case, Panama Refining v. Ryan, 293
U.S. 388 (1935), is less relevant to the rulemaking context because the Court’s opinion emphasized the
statute’s contradictory vagueness, and not its remission of the decision to a group of arguably interested parties.
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organizations or groups” the framing of “codes of fair competition for the trade
or industry,” with enforcement of the ensuing rules vested in the federal district
65
courts. The Court struck down this delegation, with the majority emphasizing
66
the absence of procedural protections in the rulemaking process, and Cardozo’s concurrence stressing the absence of standards for the contemplated
67
codes.
Most contemporary scholars believe that the nondelegation doctrine is a
68
phantom that ought to be of no concern to lawmakers or scholars. As a descriptive and predictive matter, I am prepared to accept these verdicts. But
there is another reading of Schechter that recalls Bentham’s admonitions and
which, even if it poses no legal threat to rulemaking, deserves consideration.
By composing the original rules advisory committee entirely of lawyers and legal academics, the Court performed an act of delegation much like the type
struck down in Schechter. In crude terms, it might be thought to have put the
69
foxes in charge of the hen house. One can imagine Bentham’s outrage: For
him, perhaps the only solution worse than Judge and Company would be Lawyer and Company.
Assigning to lawyers the responsibility for drafting rules by which litigation
is to be conducted appears to be a form of guild corporatism at least as suspect
as that in Schechter. Lawyers have two kinds of interests potentially at odds
with the drafting of fair and efficient rules of procedure. First, they have the
interests of their clients. American lawyers tend to represent, if not the same
70
clients, then the same kind of client throughout their careers. To the extent to
which it were possible to predict advantages from particular procedural rules,
lawyer-rulemakers might favor their clients. Second, even without particular
clients, lawyers are lawyers, and one need not have a dark view of human nature to imagine that they would draft rules that would favor their own interests.
The historical record might seem to bear out such worries. Looking with
cynical hindsight at the sixty years since the promulgation of the Federal Rules,
one can imagine a lawyers’ conspiracy to drive up fees. Certainly the results
support such a reading. As a rule, law is cheaper than facts. We have produced
a procedural system that runs on facts and is rich in ways for lawyers to produce—or resist production of—facts. Moreover, the Rules put lawyers rather
than judges in charge of the fact-producing stage of litigation. Moving the essential stages of process to the front end of litigation, they also removed it from
Schechter Poultry, 295 U.S. at 539 n.4.
See id. at 542.
See id. at 551 (Cardozo, J., concurring).
See, e.g., KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE 66 (3d ed. 1994) (observing that “[t]he Court has become increasingly candid in recognizing
its inability to enforce any meaningful limitation on Congress’ power to delegate”).
69. In this respect, it also resembles the delegation to private parties struck down in Carter v.
Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
70. See generally JOHN P. HEINZ & EDWARD O. LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS: THE SOCIAL
STRUCTURE OF THE BAR 127-28 (rev. ed. 1994) (emphasizing the client differentiation of different
segments of the bar).
65.
66.
67.
68.
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courtrooms to lawyers’ offices. Judges rule on discovery only when the parties
cannot agree, and, in spite of occasional complaints to the contrary, most cases
71
proceed without significant disagreement —and thus without judicial oversight
or knowledge.
In spite of these appearances, we should give lawyers a larger role in drafting procedural rules—at least so long as we adhere to a system that moves litigation away from trial and toward discovery and settlement. I so argue not because I believe that lawyers can be trusted to ignore their own and their clients’
interest, but because I believe that careful selection of the advisory committee
can largely balance clients’ interests and that the alternatives to accepting the
role of lawyers’ interests are even less desirable. By eliminating judges from
the drafting committee, it should be possible to neutralize client interests.
Presently composed of fourteen members, the civil rules committee is large
enough that with some thoughtful choosing, we (or, more properly, the Chief
Justice of the United States) can eliminate the more egregious forms of client
representation. In spite of the fact that lawyers characteristically represent certain kinds of clients, lawyers cannot know certainly whether particular rules will
play to client interests in particular cases. To the extent to which particular
rules are inherently incapable of such trans-substantivity, one could ask
whether they were appropriately promulgated under the provisions of the
72
Rules Enabling Act, which bars any rule that affects any substantive right.
We can bolster this hope with thoughtful transparency practices, which are
73
treated in the next section.
In fact, by rendering the lawyers’ interests more apparent and less disguised, we may improve our chances of emerging with an evenhanded policy.
74
Practicing lawyers are wary of criticizing the federal judiciary, but they base
their profession on criticizing one another, as do legal academics. So one might
imagine a more robust debate within the advisory committee unencumbered by
lawyerly deference for the life-tenured judiciary. One could do worse than defining evenhandedness and trans-substantivity as whatever emerged from a
procedure in which all notable segments of the bar were represented and required to submit draft rules both to their colleagues and to an official approving body.
At present, that approving body is the U.S. Supreme Court. For several
decades, there has been a low key debate about whether the imprimatur ought
to come from the Court or from some other group, with the Judicial Conference as the leading contender. This question is less important than resolving
the problems associated with the Advisory Committee composition or the
71. See, e.g., David Trubek et al., The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L. REV. 72, 89-90
(1983) (finding a very low rate of discovery, little judicial intervention, and a high rate of settlement in
modal civil litigation).
72. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 might provide a test of this proposition.
73. See infra Part V.A.2.
74. John Frank may be a notable, and noble, exception. See, e.g., John P. Frank, The Rules of Civil
Procedure—Agenda for Reform, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1883 (1989).
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number of steps in the process, but it is still worth addressing, particularly if we
are contemplating change. Among the groups that might have final approval
authority, the Judicial Conference is probably the worst choice. The Conference typically meets twice a year for two days. A survey of Conference agendas over several decades reveals a crowded miscellany of items, ranging from
air conditioning of courthouses to the assignment of visiting judges to judicial
75
discipline. As is appropriate for a body charged with judicial administration,
the issues are heavily administrative. There is neither the setting nor the time
for serious discussion of procedural rules. A body that lacks time for serious
consideration of rules should not have a role in approving them. If we eliminate the Conference, that leaves either the Supreme Court or the Standing
Committee on Practice and Procedure as possible approving entities. Between
76
these, I would lean toward the Standing Committee. The Court’s prestige
gives the Rules a powerful symbol of legitimacy, but a more serious danger
outweighs that benefit. The Court has the ultimate responsibility of deciding
whether a Rule, on its face or as applied, violates the Rules Enabling Act, with
its prohibition against Rules that “abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive
77
right.” As many have noted, the Court has never held any Rule to violate the
Act; Justice Harlan suggested that this circumstance flowed from the Court’s
78
initial approval of the Rules. If one believes that real judicial review of the
79
Rules is desirable, the Court should not be the final approving body. Such
real review would draw on the strength of the judiciary by giving it a genuinely
80
judicial role in the rulemaking process.
Lawyers’ client and guild interests are strong, but they are not insurmountable. More importantly, a well-designed rulemaking process will use lawyers’
interests to overcome each other. Injecting judges into the process too early, as
we presently do, risks truncating debate and involving judges prematurely in
doing what they do best—deciding whether proposed rules are fair. Equally as
bad, the current system involves judges in a debate with both Congress and the
Bar over the transparency of the process leading to promulgation of the rules.
75. The agendas appear in ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, supra
note 57 (agendas for Sept. 1945, Sept. and April 1954, Sept. and Mar. 1955, Sept. 1957, Mar. and Sept.
1961, 1962, 1965, Mar. and Oct. 1970, Mar. and Sept. 1986, 1987, 1988, 1992).
76. The choice is not, of course, limited to these bodies. Charles Geyh has proposed a permanent
fifteen-person committee, with members drawn from all branches of government. See Charles Gardner Geyh, Paradise Lost, Paradise Found: Redefining the Judiciary’s Imperiled Role in Congress, 71
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1165, 1234-49 (1996). Professor Geyh recognizes the concern that I have with this intriguing proposal. By inserting a step between the Judicial Conference and the Supreme Court, the
new committee would add to rather than substitute for the existing process. That seems to be moving
in the wrong direction. The proposal here set forth has the merit of both simplicity and experience of
previous successes.
77. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (1994).
78. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 477-78 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring).
79. The Chief Justice might continue to appoint the members of the Advisory Committee if it is
thought that his appointment increases the likelihood of service.
80. The approving body—whether Court or Committee—should have the explicit power not only
to disapprove a proposed Rule, but also to remand it with a statement of the concerns leading to remand.
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2. The Public, the Bar, and the Rules: Transparency and Access. Over the
last three decades, Congress has repeatedly questioned the rulemaking process.
Almost as regularly, Congress and the courts have cooperated in altering it.
Most of the alterations, though well intended, have been for the worse. They
have vastly increased the number of steps in the process. They have led to
ever-increasing judicial participation, further clogging the institutional arteries
and taking ever-more judges away from their primary role—judging. But
behind the congressional concerns and the resultant tinkering has stood one
issue that deserves respect: the transparency of the rulemaking process.
The original Advisory Committee and many of the committees that dominated the process through the early 1970s were very much old boys’ clubs,
which typically proceeded with a minimum of publicity and even notice of proposed rules. Although the persons in question were a distinguished lot, and we
have much to be grateful for, the time has passed in which that form of elite
dictation will be acceptable. Starting with the aborted Federal Rules of Evidence in 1974, Congress manifested increased criticism of the rules. Whenever
Congress dislikes the product of judicial rulemaking, it is likely to focus on the
process leading to that product. After a series of hearings conducted by thenRepresentative Robert Kastenmeier, Congress passed the 1988 Judicial Im81
provements and Access to Justice Act, several portions of which required increased transparency in the rulemaking process.
Most notably, these changes gave Congress and the public more time to decide what they thought of proposed rules and more information on which to
base such a decision. Subsections (c) and (d) of 28 U.S.C. § 2073 regulate the
consultative process preceding presentation of a proposed Rule to the Supreme
Court. The statutory hallmarks are notice, an opportunity for public comment,
and an explanation of recommendations, including dissenting views. In other
words, the rulemaking process itself has become proceduralized. The obvious
model was administrative rulemaking, and the statute roughly approximates
that model. Following this process, 28 U.S.C. § 2074(a) gives Congress six
months to decide whether to disapprove a Rule, further specifying that the six
months shall fall in a period where Congress is likely to be in session and to
have an opportunity to raise objections.
The statutory motives are clear and laudable. They seek to achieve public
comment and transparency of process, clarifying the motives and the debate
over each proposed rule. Moreover, these statutory requirements could apply
to the “new” rulemaking process here proposed. But a Congress prepared to
make these changes ought also to be prepared to experiment with a more ambi82
tious but less specific form of transparency.
The more ambitious transparency proposal would add to existing notice and
comment procedures by requiring the Advisory Committee to formulate, for
81. Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat. 4643 (1988) (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
82. With a possible exception for genuinely technical amendments, I have no quarrel with the six
months afforded Congress.
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each set of proposed Rules, a plan that would actively involve a cross-section of
the bar, specifically identifying those whose views might be adverse to the proposed rules. The Committee should decide the question of how best to elicit
those views. Public hearings are certainly one way, but everything from web
pages and email to targeted telephone interviews are another. The record of a
rulemaking ought to include not just a list of those who commented, but a list
of those contacted and the rationale for selection of persons and groups.
Rather than awaiting comment, the Committee might actively seek it, conducting interviews of persons with the requisite experience and thoughtfulness.
Half a dozen such conference calls, conducted by several members of the Advisory Committee, might simultaneously inform the drafters and increase awareness of pending proposals. Such targeted discussion would empower the committee actively to assume responsibility for wide circulation and broad
soliciting of views. Such a role might serve the aims of publicity and transparency better than the current transcontinental junketing and often-desultory
“hearings” at which there is little to be heard. At best, they might transform
the present hearings into focused opportunities to consider problems in a rule;
at worst, they would provide a functional substitute for those hearings.
3. Reform and Stasis. A possible objection to removing judges from the
process is the fear that the ensuing committee would be extremely cautious and
consensus-oriented, and that we might thereby lose opportunities for real
procedural reform. While this objection would be troubling if it were welltaken, history suggests that, if anything, the reverse is true. The original Rules,
surely the single most substantial procedural reform in U.S. history, came from
a judgeless committee reporting directly to the Supreme Court. The second
most substantial set of changes came in 1966 with the joinder rules, which
included the present class action rules. Whether one likes the results or not,
one cannot see that committee as timid. Yet lawyers and academics dominated
it with only three judges (eighteen percent) on a seventeen-person committee.
With a single notable exception—the now-defanged 1983 version of Rule 11—
judge-dominated, multi-step rulemaking processes have produced distinctly
cautious rules. That makes intuitive sense. The judiciary is a generally
conservative group, in the best sense of that word: Sweeping change is not the
coin in which the bench trades. Moreover, with Congress breathing down the
83
judicial neck in the last two decades, sweeping change might seem impolitic.
One cannot be certain whether the composition of the committee, the increase in the steps of the process, or some other factor, like congressional concern, has been primarily responsible for the recent caution. If one were otherwise convinced that judges should dominate rulemaking, one could imagine a
two-stage reform in which one first reduced the steps in rulemaking and later
changed the personnel. Because there seem, independently of guesses about
83. Others might add that sweeping change in some circumstances would violate the Rules Enabling Act, a sobering thought for any group of rulemakers.
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substantive effects on the rules, to be several strong advantages in removing the
judiciary from the process, I would argue for compression and recomposition of
the process at once.
4. No Role for Judges? At this point, anyone with a decent admiration for
the achievement of the Federal Rules may be quite troubled. Even if prepared
to consider the advantages of a judgeless advisory committee, one might worry
about the loss of judicial wisdom. The bench contains many people of great
thoughtfulness, experience, and integrity. Barring them from rulemaking
borders on the perverse. Fortunately, one can draw on that wisdom without
incurring the disadvantages of the present system. Because judges remain
accessible to the Advisory Committee, one would expect that the Committee
would call on judges actively, persistently, and regularly. Indeed, a welldevised consultation process could draw on more judicial voices than does the
current one. Having judges speak is different from having judges draft.
Second, if one gave to the Standing Committee the role of final approval of
proposed Rules, one would have a group dominated by judges prepared to
devote focused attention to Rules; concentrating authority is one way to have
its wielders take seriously the responsibilities of power. Finally, if one removed
the Supreme Court from the approval process, one would open the way to
genuine judicial review; a group that had played no role in promulgating a Rule
might well, in its judicial capacity, invalidate an occasional Rule, giving
subsequent committees some sense for the meaning of “adbridge, enlarge, or
84
modify.”
B. Three Advantages
If these obstacles can be overcome, three advantages would flow from
adopting the proposal sketched above. Two—saving time and reducing the
judges’ role in the politics of rulemaking—are implicit in what has already been
said. The third advantage, the defederalization of the federal rules, has become
an advantage only in recent years.
1. Time. Almost every observer objects to the slow pace of the present
process. Created in steps, each sensible from a short-range perspective, the
totality is becoming a monster. At one level, it is unfair to remark that the
Constitution was drafted and ratified in less time than it takes to amend a
Federal Rule of procedure. At another level, the criticism is justified. A twoor three-step process will inevitably speed up the present twelve-step ordeal.
Moreover, such reform will conserve the scarce time and specialized skills
of judges. We currently consume the time of forty-one state and federal judges
on various advisory and standing committees responsible for the federal rules,
and this number does not even include those on the Judicial Council. In some
cases, because the time consumed with meetings, hearings, and the like is very
84. Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (1994).
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considerable, the savings will be equally substantial. In other cases—as with
the Judicial Conference—the time spent on Rules matters is slight, but in such
instances it is all the more desirable that the process be shortened; the recent
sorry case of the too-hasty rejection of a proposed draft of Rule 48 tells us that
bad rulemaking can come just as easily from the expenditure of too little as
85
from too much judicial time. The agendas of the Judicial Conference, loaded
with twenty or more items at each of two day-long meetings, do not permit mature or thoughtful consideration of proposed rules.
2. Politics. The process here proposed reduces judges’ involvement in the
politics of rulemaking in two ways. First, by taking judges out of the groundlevel work of rule drafting, it helps to ensure that when Congress becomes
annoyed with the product of rulemaking—as it inevitably will, from time to
time—it will not direct its displeasure toward the federal judiciary. Nor will
failures of the rulemaking process—of transparency or consultation—be laid at
the judiciary’s doorstep. Second, by reserving to the judges the final, virtually
judicial, act of deciding on the overall fairness of a proposed rule, it should help
to ensure not just the political acceptability but the real fairness of a rule. It is
easier for judges to reject the work product of lawyers—they do that for a
living—than it is for them to reject the work of their judicial brothers and
sisters.
From the judiciary’s standpoint, this feature has much to recommend it. In
our system, it is sometimes necessary for the judiciary to cross swords with
Congress or the Executive. It is desirable to minimize these occurrences and to
confine them to only significant disturbances. Irritation with rules about service of process or the exclusion of psychotherapists from those permitted to
conduct Rule 34 mental examinations do not fall into the significant category.
From the standpoint of the judiciary, it is far preferable to have the lawyer
chair of the Advisory Committee on the congressional hot seat than it is to
have a federal judge, no matter how judicious and prestigious. Moreover, one
might predict that the number of times Congress will be interested in calling a
lawyer or professor chair to sit on that seat will be more infrequent than the
number of times it might seek to call a judge. First, to the extent that such
hearings may sometimes mask a more generalized irritation with the judiciary,
the tempting target will be removed. Such irritation is likely to be at its height
when judges are legislating, which is just what they do when they draft rules.
Second, “lawyers’ rules” may be substantively less likely to draw congressional
ire than “judges’ rules” because judges may sometimes suffer from a tendency
to think of themselves as still on the bench when framing procedural rules. By
contrast, with the judges no longer part of the process, lawyers will have a very
strong incentive to frame consensus rules, because that is the only way that they
will get them through a committee of peers.

85. See supra text accompanying notes 21-22.
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That incentive should be particularly strong when the committee has to present the package of proposed rules—stripped of any prior blessing—to a judi86
cial body for its approval. Removing judges from the Advisory Committee
removes the judiciary from clashes with Congress. Eliminating the present regime of approval by attrition may focus the advisory committee on its real
task—which is not to get a set of rules past the next committee hurdle, but
rather to frame an optimally evenhanded set of proposals for their first, and
only, judicial consideration. Judges are good at judging. They are experts at
evenhandedness. Taking them out of part-time legislation—procedural rulemaking—and instead letting them play a more judicial role in approving or disapproving the nearly final product will set better incentives for the advisory
committee, reduce friction with Congress, and increase the likelihood that procedural change improve the current system.
3. De-federalizing the Federal Rules. The final advantage to removing the
federal judiciary from the rulemaking process is that it will begin the process of
defederalizing the Federal Rules. In 1938, such a prospect was nonsensical:
The whole point of the enterprise was to create a distinctive, national, uniform
procedural package for federal courts. Today, most litigation under the
Federal Rules does not occur in federal courts. Some thirty-five states have
adopted versions of the federal rules, and the litigation in such states swamps
that in the federal courts, which handle only about two per cent of all civil cases
in the United States. As Geoffrey Hazard recently commented, the Federal
Rules have unintentionally created something close to a national procedure,
based in the states but sharing enough state-to-state similarity to make it
87
possible to talk about the system in a unitary way.
88
As a result of the states’ adoption of the Rules, the Advisory Committee
now has the odd task of drafting rules whose major application will be in other
jurisdictions. The present advisory committees have for several years recognized that situation by having a state court judge—generally from the jurisdiction’s highest court—sit on each committee. But that gesture, though welcome,
does not go far enough in de-federalizing and de-judicializing the drafting process. Unlike judges, lawyers cross jurisdictional boundaries. Outside governmental employ, it would be difficult to find many lawyers whose practice was
exclusively federal. Because they cross those boundaries daily, lawyers have a
better sense than federal judges as to how particular rules will play in state
courts. Having identified a difference in application or result, the reconstituted
advisory committee would face a difficult question: Should it draft a rule for its
86. I have suggested earlier the Standing Committee on Practice and Procedure. See supra text
accompanying note 76.
87. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., From Whom No Secrets Are Hid, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1665, 1669
(1998).
88. For our purposes, most of the states that have not formally adopted the Rules—for example,
California, Illinois, New York—have adopted such large portions of the Rules’ central concepts, such
as notice pleading, extensive pretrial discovery, and broad joinder, that even these Code states now
essentially resemble a Rules regime.
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primary constituency—the federal courts—or for a larger, shadow constituency
of state courts. But that is not a question that has to be answered univocally:
One could draft a rule for the federal courts with notations about adaptations
and variations for state circumstances. It would be at least odd and perhaps a
violation of federalism principles for a group of federal judges to do such a
thing. No such impropriety attaches to lawyers’ expressing such views, even
when the lawyers are appointees of the federal judiciary.
VI
A CONCLUDING PLEA
Judicial rulemaking does not leap to mind as a promising topic for a symposium on judicial independence and accountability. Of all the things that currently occupy the time of judges, the framing of procedural rules for civil cases
must rank close to the bottom of activities thought likely to engender controversy or threaten judicial independence. Procedure is not in obvious crisis, and
attacks on judges focus on decisions, not on rulemaking. In spite of this unlikelihood, judicial rulemaking warrants our attention. Historically, failed rulemaking has stood high in the list of accusations hurled at the common law judiciary, and the fate of the Bourbons awaits those who refuse to learn from
history. But beyond historical caution lies a more specific threat: The success
of the Federal Rules has masked what may be serious misjudgments about the
rulemaking process itself, misjudgments that over time will embroil the judiciary in controversy and disrespect. If I am right about this second point, matters
have recently gone from good to bad, with legislative changes exacerbating
some errors of judicial administration.
In just over half a century, we have grown a remarkable number of encrustations on an originally lean process. More than encrusted, the process has
also departed from its original design, pushing federal judges into circumstances for which they are less than ideally suited and in the process involving
them in unnecessary congressional friction. If federal judicial time were an underused resource and if the present procedural system were still trial-centered,
that judicial involvement might still be justifiable. But judicial time is scarce,
scarcer than it should be. And we have removed process from the courtroom.
Under those circumstances it is worth asking ourselves carefully and soberly
about whether we are walking slowly down a primrose path—and whether a
change of direction might not be advisable.
Jeremy Bentham disliked judges—or at least distrusted what he believed
were their guild instincts. I do not share his views. But his focus on the interests, abilities, and blindnesses of rulemakers was characteristically perceptive.
We should not be too proud to learn from the cantankerous political philosopher: Judges are better at judging than they are at rulemaking, and if we want
to preserve judges’ independence, we should not hesitate to confine them to
their field of greatest comparative advantage.

